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THE EXIGENCIES OF DRUNK DRIVING: 
CRIPPS v. STATE AND THE ISSUES  
WITH TAKING DRIVERS’ BLOOD  
WITHOUT A WARRANT 
Abstract: Few of the government’s investigatory techniques implicate individ-
ual privacy concerns more than the taking and testing of a suspect’s blood. 
These blood draws are a common tool used to fight drunk driving. In 2013, in 
Missouri v. McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the need for case-by-
case review when considering whether exigent circumstances justify warrantless 
blood testing of drunk driving suspects. An Oklahoma statute takes a different 
approach by categorically abdicating the warrant requirement and authorizing 
law enforcement to draw blood from any driver involved in an accident that re-
sults in serious bodily injury. In 2016, in Cripps v. State, the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals affirmed the constitutionality of this statute, concluding that 
this categorical exigency did not run afoul of either McNeely or the Fourth 
Amendment. This Comment discusses how the decision in Cripps represents a 
significant departure from established Fourth Amendment law that has always 
required a case-by-case approach to exigent circumstances. Accordingly, this 
Comment argues that when done without a warrant under the guise of an exi-
gency, blood draws require a high degree of judicial scrutiny to ensure that law 
enforcement officials are not encroaching on fundamental civil liberties. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, over 10,000 Americans were killed in accidents involving drunk 
driving.1 As a result, states have implemented various law enforcement tech-
niques in an effort to combat the effects of this serious issue.2 Every state now 
criminalizes driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Drunk Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY AGENCY, https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-
driving/drunk-driving [https://perma.cc/4C5P-5VC6] (noting that there were 10,497 deaths in 
2016 from crashes involving alcohol). 
 2 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (analyzing a checkpoint 
program and finding that although the program implicated the Fourth Amendment, the checkpoint 
stops were not unreasonable searches in violation of the Amendment); David C. Crosby, The Con-
stitutionality of Sobriety Checkpoints in Alaska, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 227, 227 (1991) (identifying 
sobriety checkpoints as a method used to prevent drunk driving); Justin Ferguson, The Constitu-
tionality of Passive Alcohol Sensors Under the Fourth Amendment in the Wake of Kyllo v. United 
States, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 129, 129−30 (2002) (identifying passive alcohol sensors as a method 
used to combat drunk-driving); Rick M. Grams, Walking the Line of Admissibility: Why Maryland 
Courts Should Reexamine the Admissibility of Field Sobriety Tests, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 365, 
365−66 (2005) (presenting the legal issues surrounding field sobriety tests). 
2018] Eliminating Categorical Exigencies 483 
above a certain statutory level, usually .08.3 In enforcing these criminal 
codes, law enforcement officials are required collect and measure a suspect’s 
BAC.4 Generally, this evidence is obtained through testing the suspect’s 
breath or blood.5 Such searches and seizures invariably raise constitutional 
issues, forcing legislatures and courts to optimize the investigatory powers of 
the police while also respecting individual rights.6 
Chapter 10, Section 104(B) of Title 47 of Oklahoma’s statutory code 
(the “Oklahoma statute”) authorizes law enforcement to obtain blood samples 
without a warrant from drivers of motor vehicles involved in car accidents 
that result in a fatality or serious injury.7 Brian Cripps was subjected to a war-
rantless blood draw authorized by the Oklahoma statute after he drove a car 
that was involved in a fatal accident in Oklahoma.8 The prosecution used the 
evidence obtained from the blood draw against Cripps at trial, and he was 
subsequently convicted of manslaughter.9 Cripps appealed his conviction, but 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his appeal and affirmed the 
conviction.10 
This Comment explores the legal implications of warrantless blood 
draws by examining the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ 2016 decision 
in Cripps v. State.11 Part I examines the legal framework for determining 
when law enforcement is required to obtain a search warrant and under what 
circumstances a warrantless blood draw may be taken.12 Part II explores the 
facts in Cripps and explains the reasoning used by the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals in considering the validity of the warrantless blood draw in 
this case.13 Part III challenges the Cripps court’s holding on two separate 
grounds and argues that statutory or court-made rules that establish categori-
cal exigent circumstances are unconstitutional.14 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016); see, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE 
§ 23152(b) (West Supp. 2018) (identifying .08 as the legal blood-alcohol limit in California); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (Supp. 2018) (identifying .08 as the legal blood-alcohol 
limit in Massachusetts); MO. REV. STAT. § 577.012(1) (2016 & Supp. 2017) (identifying .08 as 
the legal blood-alcohol limit in Missouri). 
 4 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2167. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See infra notes 61−86 and accompanying text. 
 7 OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 10-104(B) (2011). 
 8 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3−4, Cripps v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 2186 (2017) (No. 
16-423), 2016 WL 5673292, at *3–4 [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief]. 
 9 Id. at 5−6. 
 10 Cripps v. State, 387 P.3d 906, 908 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016). 
 11 Id. 
 12 See infra notes 15−66 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 68−116 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 117−139 and accompanying text. 
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I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 
 Blood draws implicate substantial Fourth Amendment concerns, particu-
larly when conducted without a warrant.15 Section A provides a brief intro-
duction to the Fourth Amendment and how it governs searches conducted by 
law enforcement as well as warrants.16 Section B discusses how the U.S. Su-
preme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment in the context of warrantless 
blood draws.17 Finally, Section C discusses the Oklahoma statute at issue in 
Cripps.18 
A. Searches and Seizures Under the Fourth Amendment 
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of 
limiting state intrusions on personal privacy in a free society.19 The Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the people’s privacy interests by 
prohibiting unreasonable intrusions on personal privacy by the government.20  
For an intrusion to be reasonable, the Fourth Amendment generally re-
quires law enforcement to obtain a warrant prior to executing a search or a 
seizure.21 Searches done without a warrant are presumed to be unreasonable 
and must fall under a recognized exception to warrant requirement for the 
search to be constitutional.22 Searches of the physical person are scrutinized 
closely because of the impact they have on a person’s expectation of priva-
cy.23 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178. 
 16 See infra notes 19−32 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 33−60 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 61−66 and accompanying text. 
 19 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 
(1966). 
 20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (establishing that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated”); Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (per curiam) (holding that the use 
of satellite tracking was a search of personal information under the Fourth Amendment and there-
fore is only permitted if reasonable); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (noting that the function of the 
Fourth Amendment is to prevent intrusions by the government when they are either unjustified or 
done by improper means). 
 21 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173 (noting that, subject to exceptions, a warrant must be ob-
tained prior to a search); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (“[T]his Court has inferred 
that a warrant must generally be secured.”). 
 22 Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015). One such exception is for searches 
incident to an arrest. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973). Once a police officer arrests 
someone, the police officer is generally permitted to search that person without a warrant. Id. This 
is known as a search incident to arrest. Id. These warrantless searches are permitted because it is 
reasonable for a police officer to search the arrestee for any weapons or for any evidence that the 
arrestee could potentially destroy. Id. 
 23 See Winston, 470 U.S. at 760 (recognizing that any search that involves comprising an 
individual’s “bodily integrity” necessarily implicates serious concerns of personal privacy). 
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 The Supreme Court has interpreted the text of the Fourth Amendment to 
require three things for a search warrant to be valid.24 First, a neutral magis-
trate must issue the warrant.25 Second, law enforcement must have probable 
cause that evidence of a particular crime will be discovered from the search.26 
Finally, the warrant must clearly identify the places or people that will be 
searched and the items that will be seized.27 
A well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the exigent cir-
cumstances exception, applies when the particular circumstances of the situa-
tion make the needs of law enforcement compelling enough that a warrantless 
search is objectively reasonable.28 Exigency differs from other exceptions to 
the warrant requirement in that exigent circumstances are determined on a 
case-by-case basis while other exceptions apply categorically.29 If there is 
probable cause that a crime as been committed, and law enforcement officers 
believe that the delay required to obtain a warrant would hinder their interests 
in preventing or investigating criminal activity, exigent circumstances exist 
and a warrant is not required.30 To determine whether an exigency exists in a 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979). 
 25 Id. In the narrow context of bodily searches, the Supreme Court has emphasized the im-
portance of a neutral assessment of probable cause because of the substantial stakes of forcibly 
infringing on an individual’s bodily integrity. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. 
 26 Dalia, 441 U.S. at 255. The Supreme Court has explained that the probable cause standard 
looks at “whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which 
they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believ-
ing” that a crime was being committed or had been committed by the arrestee. Beck v. Ohio, 379 
U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also Gomez v. State, 168 P.3d 1139, 1142−43 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) 
(finding probable cause existed for a warrantless search of a vehicle where the car crossed the 
center line, the driver smelled of alcohol, and there was a missing bottle from a six-pack of alco-
hol in the vehicle); State v. Paul, 62 P.3d 389, 390 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that an alert 
signal from a drug-sniffing dog gives the police probable cause to search a vehicle without a war-
rant); Lozoya v. State, 932 P.2d 22, 33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (finding probable cause existed 
for a warrantless search of a vehicle where the officer detected a strong odor of marijuana emanat-
ing from the vehicle). 
 27 Dalia, 441 U.S. at 255. The warrant must clearly identify the places to be searched and 
items to be seized to prevent police officers from discretionarily searching or seizing once they 
have a warrant. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195−96 (1927).  
 28 King, 563 U.S. at 460. An example of a recognized exigency occurs when the police enter a 
private home in pursuit of a suspect where they have probable cause that the suspect recently en-
tered the home. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42−43 (1976) (holding that the police 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they pursued an individual, whom they had probable 
cause to believe was distributing narcotics, into her home without a warrant and arrested her). 
 29 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174. To say that an exception applies “categorically” means that 
once the specified conditions of the exception are met, the police do not need to make an addition-
al showing using facts from the case. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 
(1973) (explaining that the search incident to arrest exception authorizes a warrantless search in 
every instance where a custodial arrest is made). 
 30 King, 563 U.S. at 460 (discussing the probable cause standard); see also Alexander Porter, 
“Time Works Changes”: Modernizing Fourth Amendment Law to Protect Cell Site Location In-
formation, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1781, 1810 (2016) (describing the exigent circumstances exception as 
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particular case, courts examine whether the search was reasonable in light of 
the totality of the circumstances.31 The exigent circumstance that often ap-
plies to warrantless blood draws of suspected drunk-drivers is when law en-
forcement believes that a warrantless search is necessary to prevent the im-
minent destruction of evidence resulting from the natural dissipation of alco-
hol in the bloodstream.32 
B. Relevant U.S. Supreme Court Case Law  
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the specific issue of warrantless 
blood draws of motor vehicle operators in several cases.33 In 1966, in 
Schmerber v. California, the Court considered several constitutional claims 
related to warrantless blood draws of suspected drunk drivers for the first 
time.34 In Schmerber, the defendant was involved in an automobile accident 
                                                                                                                           
a “safety valve” that enables law enforcement to act when their needs and the need to protect the 
public are greatest). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has a formulation of the 
exigent circumstances exception that is helpful in understanding the concept. See United States v. 
Caraballo, 831 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2016). The Caraballo court held that an exigency exists 
when a reasonable police officer, when confronted with the same facts as existed at the time of the 
search or seizure, would determine that there was an “urgent need to take action or render aid.” Id. 
 31 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013) (plurality opinion); see also Coffey v. 
State, 99 P.3d 249, 252 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (finding exigent circumstances for a warrantless 
entry of a home where the police officer knew that an individual was inside and the officer sus-
pected that the home was a drug lab because of the familiar smell of a volatile and dangerous 
chemical); Fisher v. State, 668 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (finding exigent circum-
stances existed for an officer to search a suspect's pockets for identifying information where the 
suspect was involved in a high speed collision and had to be taken to the hospital). But see Burton 
v. State, 204 P.3d 772, 775 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that there were no exigent circum-
stances to enter a dwelling when the police knew that a suspect was inside but had no additional 
evidence indicating that the suspect would attempt to escape or destroy evidence). 
 32 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770−71 (considering whether the potential destruction of evi-
dence justified the warrantless blood draw taken by the police). To further illustrate the exigent 
circumstances analysis, the Tenth Circuit has developed a four-factor test when considering 
whether the imminent destruction of evidence exigency exists. United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 
1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 1988). The test considers whether (1) there is clear evidence of probable 
cause; (2) the case involves a serious crime and in circumstances in which the destruction of evi-
dence is likely; (3) the search was limited to what was necessary to protect the evidence from 
destruction; and (4) the presence of clear indicators of exigency not subject to police manipula-
tion. Id. 
 33 See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 147 (considering warrantless blood draws of suspected drunk 
drivers under the exigent circumstances exception); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759 (examining vari-
ous constitutional claims, including a Fourth Amendment claim, when police took a suspect’s 
blood without a warrant). The Supreme Court has also considered warrantless blood draws in the 
context of the search incident to arrest exception. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172 (considering 
the constitutionality of warrantless breath-tests and blood draws of suspected drunk drivers in light 
of the search incident to arrest exception). 
 34 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759; see McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148. The defendant in Schmerber 
alleged that the warrantless blood draw violated his rights under the Fourth (right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures), Fifth (right against self-incrimination), Sixth (right to coun-
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and was taken to the hospital.35 The responding police officer observed signs 
of intoxication both at the scene of the accident and at the hospital.36 Without 
a warrant, the officer instructed medical personnel at the hospital to conduct a 
blood draw.37 At trial, the defendant unsuccessfully objected to the use of 
evidence obtained by the blood draw against him and was convicted of driv-
ing under the influence.38 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the 
warrantless search and seizure did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights.39 Accordingly, the Court determined that the warrantless blood 
draw was constitutional.40 In the Court’s view, the officer reasonably believed 
that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant would lead to the destruction of 
evidence because alcohol dissipates from the bloodstream and it would take 
time to get the defendant to the hospital to be tested.41 Furthermore, in as-
sessing the reasonableness of the search, the Court highlighted that the de-
fendant had a reduced expectation of privacy because medically trained per-
sonnel conducted the draw in a hospital and used a common medical tech-
nique to take the defendant’s blood.42 The Court therefore found that an exi-
gency existed and the warrantless search was reasonable.43 
More recently in 2013, in McNeely v. Missouri, the Court considered 
whether the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes a 
categorical exigency resulting in an exception the warrant requirement.44 In 
McNeely, a police officer pulled the defendant over and observed several 
signs of intoxication, such as bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of 
alcohol.45 The police officer arrested the defendant, who later refused to take 
a breath-test.46 The officer drove the defendant to a hospital to take a blood 
sample.47 When the defendant refused to consent to the blood sample, the 
                                                                                                                           
sel), and Fourteenth (right to due process). Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759; see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV; id. amend. V; id. amend. VI; id. amend. XIV. 
 35 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758. 
 36 Id. at 768−69. 
 37 Id. at 758. 
 38 Id. at 759. 
 39 Id. at 759, 772. 
 40 Id. at 770. 
 41 Id. at 770−71. 
 42 Id. at 771−72. The Supreme Court suggested, without explicitly holding, that blood draws 
done with less precise, riskier methods, or by people without medical training may alter the rea-
sonableness of the search. See id. (using the example of a blood draw being done in a police sta-
tion by an officer to illustrate a situation where more serious privacy concerns may be raised by a 
warrantless blood draw). 
 43 Id. 
 44 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 147. 
 45 Id. at 145. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 145−46. 
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officer ordered an employee of the hospital to take the sample under a Mis-
souri statute that authorized the conducting of a blood test of any individual 
arrested for driving while intoxicated.48 From the time that the officer stopped 
the defendant until the blood was taken, the officer made no attempt to pro-
cure a warrant.49 The defendant moved to exclude the results of the blood test 
from trial, arguing that the warrantless blood sample was taken in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.50 The trial court granted the motion to suppress the 
evidence and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision 
on appeal.51 The Missouri Supreme Court held that the fact that alcohol will 
dissipate in the bloodstream as time passes does not constitute a categorical 
exigency for the purposes of the warrant requirement because there may be 
cases in which a warrant can be obtained without the risk of the destruction of 
evidence.52 The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that there were no “spe-
cial facts of exigency” that indicated that the police could not obtain a warrant 
before conducting the blood draw and highlighted the fact that there was 
nothing that would delay the officer's efforts to obtain a warrant such as an 
accident or injuries that would require the officer's time and attention.53 
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the dissipation of alcohol 
does not create a categorical exigent circumstance that functions as an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement.54 The Court rejected the categorical approach 
and reaffirmed the approach taken in Schmerber requiring a case-by-case 
analysis.55 The McNeely Court recognized that, depending on the facts of 
each particular case, the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream could sup-
port a finding of exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw.56 
Ultimately, however, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a 
case-specific analysis that examines the totality of the circumstances when 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 146; see MO. REV. STAT. § 577.020(1) (2016 & Supp. 2017) (authorizing, inter alia, 
the blood testing of anyone arrested for operating a vehicle in an intoxicated condition). Upon 
analysis, McNeely’s blood alcohol content (“BAC”) was .154, which was above Missouri’s legal 
limit of .08. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 146; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 577.012(1) (identifying .08 as 
the legal blood-alcohol limit in Missouri). McNeely was then charged with driving while intoxi-
cated under MO. REV. STAT. § 577.010 (MO. REV. STAT. § 577.010). McNeely, 569 U.S. at 146. 
 49 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 145. 
 50 Id. at 146. 
 51 State v. McNeely (McNeely I), 358 S.W.3d 65, 67 (Mo. 2012). 
 52 Id. at 74. 
 53 Id. at 74−75. 
 54 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 164−65. 
 55 Id. at 149−50; see also McNeely I, 358 S.W.3d at 74−75 (rejecting a categorical exigency). 
 56 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 156 (highlighting Schmerber as an example where the facts of the 
case create a situation where an exigency exists and a warrant is not required to take a blood sam-
ple). 
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determining whether a warrantless blood draw violates the Fourth Amend-
ment.57  
Finally, in 2016, in Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court found 
a warrantless blood draw was too intrusive to be permitted under the search 
incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment, another categorical 
exception.58 In assessing the intrusiveness of blood draws, the Court pointed 
to the physical penetration of the skin as well as the wealth of personal infor-
mation that is potentially accessible through a blood sample as important fac-
tors.59 In its holding, the Court recognized the availability of less intrusive 
methods for obtaining the required evidence while rejecting a categorical au-
thorization of warrantless blood draws under the search incident to arrest ex-
ception.60 
C. Oklahoma Law Authorizing Warrantless Blood Draws 
Against the backdrop of these constitutional principles, the Oklahoma 
statute authorizes warrantless blood draws from drivers of vehicles involved 
in accidents that result in a fatality or great bodily injury where the driver 
could be cited for a traffic offense as a result of the accident.61 This statute 
contains several elements, with the first element requiring the existence of an 
accident that results in death or great bodily injury.62 Second, the suspect 
must have been a driver of one of the vehicles involved in the accident.63 Fi-
nally, the suspect must have been able to be cited for a traffic offense for his 
or her involvement in the accident.64 The statute provides that the fact that the 
suspect’s actions could constitute a traffic offense serves as probable cause.65 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id.; see supra note 28–32 and accompanying text (explaining the exigent circumstance 
exception to the warrant requirement). 
 58 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185; see also supra note 29 (explaining that the search incident to 
arrest exception to the warrant requirement is a categorical exception). 
 59 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178. Another factor considered by the Court was that blood cells 
are not actively given off in the same manner as breaths or skin cells. Id. That an individual’s 
blood is not collected without the bodily invasion was a significant factor distinguishing breath 
tests from blood tests. Id. 
 60 Id. at 2185. The Supreme Court specifically pointed to breath tests, commonly known as 
“breathalyzers,” as an available less-intrusive method. Id. 
 61 OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 10-104(B); see OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 646 (2011) (defining “great 
bodily injury” as “bone fracture, protracted and obvious disfigurement, protracted loss or impair-
ment of the function of a body part, organ or mental faculty, or substantial risk of death”); see also 
Guest v. State, 42 P.3d 289, 291 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that, for purposes of section 
10-104(B) (the “Oklahoma statute”), it is enough that the subject of the search was the driver of a 
vehicle involved in an accident, that he could be cited for a traffic offense, and that the accident 
resulted in the immediate death of a person). 
 62 OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 10-104(B). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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The driver need not actually be arrested or issued a citation at the scene of the 
accident; the mere fact that the driver could have been is enough.66 
II. THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS’ APPROVAL OF 
WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAWS IN CRIPPS V. STATE 
Against this backdrop, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals consid-
ered the permissibility of a warrantless blood draw in Cripps v. State.67 Sec-
tion A discusses the facts underlying the 2016 decision in Cripps v. State.68 
Section B presents the procedural history behind the conviction and appeal.69 
Section C examines the various issues and explains the holdings on each.70 
A. The Facts of Cripps v. State 
On the night of March 25, 2012, Brian Cripps, Justin Gibson, and Sam-
uel Dash were drinking at a bar in Tulsa, Oklahoma.71 The three men eventu-
ally left the bar in Gibson’s SUV with Cripps driving.72 The SUV was in-
volved in a single-car roll-over after speeding on an exit ramp.73 Officers first 
arrived at the scene around 1:40 A.M. and saw Dash’s dead body on the 
ground.74 Gibson was unharmed and found walking around outside of the 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id.; see Bemo v. State, 298 P.3d 1190, 1191 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (holding that the 
Oklahoma statute does not require an arrest or citation at the scene of the accident). In McNeely, 
the Supreme Court considered the implications of warrantless blood draws after the subject of the 
search had been arrested. See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 145−46 (explaining that the defendant’s fail-
ure to take a breath test after being pulled over for erratic driving led to him being arrested and 
subjected to a warrantless blood draw). A warrantless arrest is valid where the police officer has 
probable cause that the person being arrested committed a felony. Davis v. State, 792 P.2d 76, 84 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1990). Therefore, there will presumably always be probable cause whenever a 
warrantless blood draw is done on an individual that has been lawfully arrested. See id. The rule 
created by the Oklahoma statute, however, authorizes warrantless searches prior to any arrest 
being made. See Guest, 42 P.3d at 291 (holding that, for the purposes of the Oklahoma statute, all 
that is required for a warrantless blood draw is that the individual was driving a vehicle in the 
accident and could be cited for a traffic offense). 
 67  Cripps v. State, 387 P.3d 906, 909 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016). 
 68 See infra notes 71−89 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra notes 90−101 and accompanying text. 
 70 See infra notes 102−116 and accompanying text. 
 71 Brief in Opposition at 3−4, Cripps v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 2186 (2017) (No. 16-423), 2016 
WL 7451279, at *3–4. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals omitted any discussion of the 
facts of the case in its opinion. See Cripps v. State, 387 P.3d 906, 908 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016) 
(omitting facts and proceeding to the discussion of legal issues presented on appeal). The recited 
facts are drawn from Cripps’s brief in support of his petition for certiorari from the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the respondent’s brief in opposition to certiorari. See infra notes 73–102 and accompa-
nying text (reciting the facts and procedural history of Cripps and citing to the parties’ briefs). 
 72 Brief in Opposition, supra note 71, at 2. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
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wreckage.75 The fire department had to extract an unconscious Cripps from 
the vehicle.76 Immediately thereafter, Cripps was taken to the hospital in an 
ambulance.77 While in the ambulance, the paramedics smelled alcohol on his 
breath.78 
Around 1:52 A.M., Tulsa Police Department Officer Mark Ohnesorge 
arrived at the scene of the accident.79 Officer Ohnesorge’s supervisor told him 
to go to the hospital to speak with Cripps there.80 After approximately fifty-
five minutes, Officer Ohnesorge saw Cripps at the hospital but was unable to 
speak with him because Cripps was still unconscious.81 At that time, Officer 
Ohnesorge observed that Cripps smelled of alcohol.82 Meanwhile, officers 
investigating the accident scene informed Officer Ohnesorge that the car also 
smelled of alcohol.83 
Officer Ohnesorge later testified that he believed a blood draw was nec-
essary at that time because Cripps was unconscious, smelled of alcohol, and 
was in critical condition with serious head trauma at the hospital.84 Officer 
Ohnesorge did not obtain a warrant prior to the blood draw.85 Officer 
Ohnesorge further testified that it would have taken approximately ninety 
minutes to obtain a warrant so early in the morning.86 Moreover, Cripps 
would be unavailable for an extended period of time due to emergency sur-
gery or possible death.87 At around 3:15 a.m., a nurse drew blood from an 
unconscious Cripps using a kit provided by Officer Ohnesorge.88 The analysis 
of the blood sample revealed that Cripps’s BAC was 0.249, more than three 
times Oklahoma’s legal limit of .08.89 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. Gibson told the police that Cripps was the driver of the vehicle after initially identifying 
himself as the driver. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 4. 
 76 Brief in Opposition, supra note 71, at 2−3. 
 77 Id. at 3. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. Officer Ohnesorge testified that it took him about fifteen minutes to reach the hospital 
and another forty minutes before he was allowed to access Cripps. Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 3−4. 
 84 Id. at 4−5. 
 85 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 4. 
 86 Brief in Opposition, supra note 71, at 5. 
 87 Id. at 4. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id.; see OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-902(A)(1) (2011 & Supp. 2017) (identifying .08 as the 
legal limit for BAC in Oklahoma). 
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B. Procedural History of Cripps v. State 
Cripps was eventually charged with first-degree manslaughter.90 Prior 
to his trial in the District Court of Tulsa County, Cripps moved to exclude 
the evidence of his BAC on the grounds that it had been obtained without a 
warrant and in the absence of any exigent circumstances.91 The exigent cir-
cumstances exception to the warrant requirement allows for searches and 
seizures without a warrant where there is probable cause that a crime has 
been committed and the officers are confronted with an emergency.92 The 
Oklahoma District Court found that exigent circumstances existed and de-
nied Cripps’s motion to suppress the evidence related to BAC.93 Looking at 
the totality of the circumstances, the judge found that Officer Ohnesorge 
reasonably believed that, in the immediate future, Cripps would either die 
or go into surgery.94 The judge therefore found that it was reasonable for Of-
ficer Ohnesorge to believe that the blood draw was necessary under the cir-
cumstances to preserve evidence of Cripps’s BAC.95 A second judge also 
found that exigent circumstances existed and denied Cripps’s renewed motion 
to exclude the BAC evidence.96  
At trial, an accident reconstruction expert testified that his analysis 
found that Cripps was likely on the left side of the vehicle, leading to the con-
clusion that he was the driver responsible for the accident.97 Cripps was con-
victed of second-degree manslaughter and sentenced to a four year impris-
onment and a $1,000 fine.98 Cripps appealed his conviction to the Oklahoma 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 5 (stating that Cripps was charged with “Manslaughter-
First Degree—Automobile”); Brief in Opposition, supra note 71, at 4 (stating that Cripps was 
charged with vehicular manslaughter). Although the statute under which Cripps was convicted is 
not explicitly clear, both parties state in their briefs that Cripps was charged with manslaughter 
and convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of second degree manslaughter. Petitioner’s 
Brief, supra note 8, at 5–6; Brief in Opposition, supra note 71, at 7. In Oklahoma, a person com-
mits first-degree manslaughter when they commit a homicide during the commission of a misde-
meanor. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 711(1) (2011). The predicate misdemeanor can be any misde-
meanor. State v. Haworth, 283 P.3d 311, 318 (Okla. Crim. App. 2012); see also id. at 317 (recog-
nizing that driving while impaired is an applicable misdemeanor for the purposes of § 711(1)). 
 91 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 5; Brief in Opposition, supra note 71, at 4. 
 92 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978). 
 93 Brief in Opposition, supra note 71, at 5. 
 94 Id. at 5−6. When applying a totality of the circumstances standard, a court looks to “the 
whole picture.” See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417−18 (1981) (framing the totality of 
the circumstances standard in the context of determining whether an officer had probable cause to 
arrest). 
 95 Brief in Opposition, supra note 71, at 5. 
 96 Id. at 6. 
 97 Cripps, 387 P.3d at 908. 
 98 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 5; Brief in Opposition, supra note 71, at 7. In Oklahoma, 
second-degree manslaughter is defined in “catch-all” terms as an unlawful killing that does not 
meet the definition of either murder or first-degree manslaughter. Walters v. State, 48 P.2d 875, 
876 (Okla. Crim. App. 1935); see OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7 (2011 & Supp. 2017) (defining first 
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Court of Criminal Appeals.99 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 
conviction.100 Cripps then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court 
denied review.101  
C. The Cripps Court’s Consideration of the Admissibility of Expert Opinion 
Testimony and Evidence from the Warrantless Blood Draw 
On appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Cripps chal-
lenged his conviction on three separate grounds.102 The court first considered 
whether the trial court mistakenly admitted the opinion testimony of an acci-
dent reconstruction expert.103 To be admissible, an expert’s opinion testimony 
must be the result of the application of recognized techniques based on suffi-
cient facts.104 If the expert’s opinion goes to the ultimate issue of the case, it is 
admissible as long as the expert does not tell or instruct the jury what result to 
reach on the ultimate issue.105 The Cripps court found that the testimony was 
admissible because the expert simply testified that the reconstruction analysis 
led him to believe that Cripps was on the left side of the vehicle and did not 
instruct the jury to conclude that Cripps was driving.106 
                                                                                                                           
degree murder as a homicide done with malice aforethought, homicide during certain felonies, 
certain homicides in connection with drug crimes, and intentional homicide of a law enforcement 
officer); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.8 (2011) (defining second degree murder as homicide “[w]hen 
perpetrated by an act imminently dangerous to another person and evincing a depraved mind” or 
when committed during felonies not listed in section 701.7); id. § 711 (defining first degree man-
slaughter as a homicide committed during a misdemeanor or a homicide that is legally excusable 
or justifiable). 
 99 Brief in Opposition, supra note 71, at 7. 
 100 Cripps, 387 P.3d at 908. 
 101 Cripps v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 2186 (denying review). 
 102 Cripps, 387 P.3d at 908. 
 103 Id. An “accident reconstruction expert” is a witness who attempts to describe how the 
accident occurred based on a forensic review of the available physical evidence and eyewitness 
reports. James T. Clancy, Jr., Computer Generated Accident Reenactments: The Case for Their 
Admissibility and Use, 15 REV. LITIG. 203, 206 (1996). 
 104 Cripps, 387 P.3d at 908. 
 105 Id.; see, e.g., Day v. State, 303 P.3d 291, 297−98 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (holding that an 
expert’s opinion testimony was admissible where the ultimate issue was whether the defendant 
abused the victim and the expert testimony in the case provided support for the conclusion that the 
defendant abused the victim but did not directly tell the jury that the evidence proved that the 
defendant abused the victim); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2704 (2011) (stating that a party 
cannot object to the opinion testimony of an expert witness solely because it speaks to the ultimate 
issue of the case). An “ultimate issue” is an unresolved matter that can decide a case either on its 
own, or as part of a more comprehensive theory. Ultimate Issue, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). 
 106 Cripps, 387 P.3d at 908. The ultimate issue in this case was whether Cripps was driving 
the vehicle. See id. The expert also testified that his analysis supported the conclusion that the 
passenger who died was in the back seat and the third person in the vehicle was on the right side 
of the vehicle. Id. By testifying that his analysis revealed that Cripps was the only passenger on 
the left side of the vehicle, the expert provided evidence that Cripps was driving the vehicle. Id. 
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The Cripps court next considered whether the trial court erred in deny-
ing Cripps’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the warrantless 
blood draw.107 Prior to trial, Cripps argued that the blood draw violated his 
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.108 On appeal, Cripps contended that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 de-
cision in Missouri v. McNeely rendered the Oklahoma statute unconstitution-
al.109 Under Oklahoma law, appellate courts review trial court findings of fact 
for clear error, but review rulings of law de novo.110 This standard of review 
is referred to as abuse of discretion.111 
The Cripps court rejected Cripps’s argument, holding that the decision 
in McNeely was distinguishable and therefore did not govern this case.112 
Specifically, the Cripps court distinguished the Oklahoma statute from the 
statute at issue in McNeely because it only applies to suspects involved in 
serious accidents whereas the statute in McNeely authorizes blood draws from 
all drivers who have been arrested on suspicion of driving under the influ-
ence.113 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the two statutes address differ-
ent issues and that this difference is dispositive.114 The Cripps court reasoned 
that the Oklahoma statute focused on the death or great bodily injury caused 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Id. at 909. 
 108 Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 8, at 5. Although the Cripps court focused its analysis on 
Cripps’s argument that the Oklahoma statute was invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in McNeely, Cripps’s original argument for suppression of the evidence at the pre-trial sup-
pression hearing did not raise a challenge under McNeely because the hearing pre-dated the 
McNeely decision. Compare id. (noting that the suppression hearing was held in January 2013), 
with Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 141 (2013) (plurality opinion) (noting that the case was 
decided in April 2013). It is also important to note that both of the judges who considered Cripps’s 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the blood draw applied a totality of the circum-
stances analysis to their findings of fact and ruled that exigent circumstances existed. See Brief in 
Opposition, supra note 71, at 5–6 (discussing the two judge’s orders on Cripps’s motions to sup-
press). On appeal, the Cripps court did not review the trial court’s findings under the totality test. 
Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909. Instead, the court focused on Cripps’s claim that McNeely rendered the 
Oklahoma statute unconstitutional. Id. 
 109 Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909. 
 110 Id. These two standards of review, de novo and clearly error, differ in the level of defer-
ence given to the findings of the trial court. Compare State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Spradling, 
213 P.3d 570, 573 (Okla. 2009) (explaining that the de novo standard requires a reviewing court to 
reconsider the lower court’s conclusions with no deference to the lower court’s determinations), 
with Neloms v. State, 274 P.3d 161, 170 (Okla. Crim. App. 2012) (explaining that a lower court’s 
findings should only be overturned when it is clear that the facts before the court do not support 
the findings). 
 111 Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id.; compare MO. REV. STAT. § 577.020(1) (2016 & Supp. 2017) (applying to all drivers 
who have been arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence), with OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, 
§ 10-104(B) (2011) (applying only to drivers who are involved in accidents that result in death or 
great bodily injury). 
 114 Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909. 
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by the accident whereas the Missouri law focused on the natural dissipation 
of alcohol.115 For that reason, the Cripps court determined that the holding of 
the Supreme Court in McNeely did not invalidate the Oklahoma statute.116 
III. THE CRIPPS COURT DEPARTED FROM WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES 
WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES  
JUSTIFIES WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAWS 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ 2016 decision in Cripps v. 
State establishing a categorical rule that deals with the admissibility of evi-
dence obtained from a warrantless blood draw is likely unconstitutional for 
two reasons.117 Section A explains how the Cripps court failed to recognize 
that warrantless blood draws, because of their intrusiveness, are impermissi-
ble where less intrusive alternatives are available.118 Section B argues that, as 
the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in Missouri v. McNeely, to find that exi-
gent circumstances exist, a court must examine the totality of the circum-
stances in each case, making any categorical exigent circumstance unconstitu-
tional.119 
A. The Cripps Court’s Assessment of the Level of Intrusion Created by 
Oklahoma’s Categorical Rule and the Fourth Amendment Consequences 
The Cripps court’s analysis does not properly characterize the privacy 
concerns implicated by warrantless blood draws.120 The Cripps court distin-
guished the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in McNeely v. Missouri on 
two grounds: (1) the scope of the rules created; and (2) the proffered exigent 
circumstance in each case.121 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the 
centrality of reasonableness in questions involving the Fourth Amendment.122 
The level of privacy interests implicated by warrantless blood draws illus-
trates why courts have taken a careful approach when structuring the rules 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id.; see also McNeely, 569 U.S. at 151−52 (discussing the state’s argument that a warrant-
less search is proper when there is probable cause that a suspect is operating under the influence of 
alcohol because the alcohol is constantly dissipating from the bloodstream). 
 116 See Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909. 
 117 See Cripps v. State, 387 P.3d 906, 909−10 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016) (discussing the cate-
gorical rule for warrantless blood draws created by the Oklahoma statute). 
 118 See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016) (recognizing that the availa-
bility of less-intrusive methods will generally make warrantless blood draws unreasonable). 
 119 See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013) (plurality opinion) (holding that a 
case-by-case analysis is required for exigent circumstances). 
 120 See Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909 (remaining silent on the intrusiveness of blood draws). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 
U.S. 398, 403 (2006)) (“As the text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amend-
ment is “reasonableness.”’”). 
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that govern these searches.123 The need for thoughtful balancing may be at its 
zenith when the courts are considering rules that apply categorically and thus 
shield government action from meaningful individualized judicial review.124 
Therefore, it is important to address the intrusion caused by warrantless blood 
draws so that individual privacy interests can be properly weighed against the 
state’s interests.125 
As discussed supra, the Supreme Court has recently addressed the intru-
siveness of blood draws.126 In contrast to the interest-balancing approach tak-
en by the Supreme Court in 2016 in Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Cripps 
court simply held that the categorical rule authorizing warrantless blood 
draws was permissible because it was distinguishable from the rule in 
McNeely.127 It is true that the rule that was struck down in McNeely likely 
would have applied in a greater number of cases than the rule considered in 
Cripps because it applied in every instance where a driver was suspected of a 
DUI.128 This difference alone, however, does not render the reasoning of the 
McNeely Court inapplicable or mean that the rule is consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment.129 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Birchfield and its analysis of the intru-
siveness of blood draws indicate that categorical rules authorizing warrantless 
blood draws are likely unconstitutional because of the level of intrusion rep-
resented by these searches.130 Moreover, the categorical rule adopted in 
Cripps is flawed because circumstances may arise where there are other 
methods for obtaining the evidence and the warrantless blood draw is likely 
unreasonable in light of the ruling in Birchfield.131 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct at 2178; see also McNeely, 569 U.S. at 159 (plurality opinion) (reaf-
firming that forced blood draws result in substantial encroachments on individual privacy). 
 124 See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 156 (recognizing the importance of case-by-case analysis when 
assessing the reasonableness of a search conducted outside of the normal warrant procedures). 
 125 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Compare id. at 2178 (analyzing impact of warrantless blood draws on privacy interests), 
with Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909 (distinguishing McNeely on the grounds that there was a significant 
enough difference between the rules). 
 128 See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 146−47 (describing the scope of the categorical rule adopted by 
the lower court in that case); Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909. 
 129 See Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909 (concluding that McNeely was distinguishable because the 
statute at issue in McNeely was different than the Oklahoma statute being addressed in this case); 
see also McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149−53, 156 (emphasizing importance of a case-by-case approach 
to exigent circumstances). 
 130 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184. 
 131 Id. at 2185. In most investigations, if not all, where evidence of intoxication or operating 
under the influence is sought, breath tests will be a less-intrusive and available as an alternative to 
blood draws. See id. at 2167 (observing that testing an individual’s breath is “the most common 
and economical method” of determining whether the individual is intoxicated or under the influ-
ence). 
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B. Reading McNeely to Hold That Statutes Creating Categorical Exigent 
Circumstances Are Unconstitutional 
Additionally, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals erred in Cripps 
in its application of McNeely because it failed to follow the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s direction on the applicability of categorical rules to the determination 
of exigent circumstances.132 In McNeely, the Court reaffirmed the need for 
individualized judicial review when considering whether exigent circum-
stances justified a warrantless blood draw because there will invariably be 
cases where the police could obtain a warrant before conducting the blood 
draws, which the Fourth Amendment mandates whenever possible.133 The 
Cripps court explicitly recognized this portion of the McNeely opinion.134 But 
in the very next paragraph of its opinion, the Cripps court approved of the 
categorical exigency created by the Oklahoma statute instead of applying the 
case-by-case approach that it just described.135 
Although the McNeely holding concentrated on whether the dissipation 
of alcohol is a categorical exigent circumstance, the Court’s reasoning strong-
ly suggests that any rule that creates a categorical exigency is unconstitution-
al.136 As the McNeely Court noted, overbroad categorical exigencies are 
simply incompatible with the Fourth Amendment, particularly in situations 
involving warrantless blood where substantial individual privacy interests are 
at stake.137 Furthermore, the purpose of the exigency exception is incompati-
ble with categorical rules because exigencies are inherently fact-specific.138 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Compare McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149−153, 156 (discussing the need for case-specific analy-
sis when determining whether exigent circumstances existed), with Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909 (ap-
proving a categorical exigency). 
 133 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149−153, 156; see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 
(2002) (explaining that categorical rules are “inappropriate” for cases arising under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 134 Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909 (noting that “[t]he [Supreme] Court found that exigency must be 
determined case by case, based on the totality of the circumstances”). 
 135 See id. (determining that “[t]he exigent circumstance justifying the categorical rule in [the 
Oklahoma statute] is the existence of great bodily injury or a fatality to persons including the driv-
er”). 
 136 Compare McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149−153, 156 (discussing the need for a case-specific 
analysis when determining whether exigent circumstances exist), with Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909 
(approving a categorical exigency standard). 
 137 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 158. 
 138 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201; see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (recognizing 
that the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement exists because the Court rec-
ognizes that there are occasions where the particular situation confronting the police make it rea-
sonable for the police to conduct a search or seizure without a warrant). The Court has consistent-
ly required a case-by-case analysis is required in the context of exigencies because the factual 
variance between cases naturally makes it difficult, if not impossible, to tailor categorical rules 
that fit every factual scenario in which exigencies may arise.  See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149−53, 
156 (discussing the need for case-specific analysis when determining whether exigent circum-
stances existed). 
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in McNeely and its development 
of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement lead to the 
conclusion that a categorical rule applying to any exigent circumstance ex-
ception is unconstitutional.139 
CONCLUSION 
The inherent tension between individual liberty and the role of the state 
in providing collective security is borne out in legal challenges to the policies 
and procedures used to combat drunk driving. This gives the courts a solemn 
responsibility to balance these ever-competing interests. Although the ends 
were certainly legitimate, the means to those ends authorized by the Oklaho-
ma Court of Criminal Appeals crosses the line separating the reasonable from 
the unreasonable. Going forward, the best way for courts to balance individu-
al and state interests when considering the validity of warrantless blood draws 
is a careful case-by-case approach. This properly balances the competing in-
terests because it permits the government to conduct invasive warrantless 
searches only in limited situations where the needs of law enforcement make 
the searches necessary. Most importantly, a case-by-case approach ensures 
that every warrantless blood draw will be subjected to judicial oversight. 
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 139 Compare McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149−153, 156 (discussing the need for case-specific analy-
sis when determining whether exigent circumstances existed), with Cripps, 387 P.3d at 909 (ap-
proving a categorical exigency standard). 
